The Battles of Brandywine and Germantown
In 1777 morale briefly returned to the Continental army. Washington used surprise to defeat the Hessians at the Battle of Trenton and the British at the Battle of Princeton. But the Continental troops, outnumbered and outmaneuvered, were badly defeated at the battles of Brandywine and Germantown. These defeats were devastating, even with the American victory at Saratoga. The Americans lost Philadelphia, and their numbers were reduced from 15,000 to 6000.
The Battle of Brandywine
Ignoring his orders to aid General Burgoyne in New York, General Howe decided in late August to attack Philadelphia instead. Washington went south towards Wilmington to prevent the capture of the city.
"On 9th September 1777 Washington’s army took positions behind the Brandywine Creek at Chad’s Ford (now Chadds Ford). The creek flowed through undulating countryside with steep cliffs in places and heavily wooded hills. Below Chad’s Ford the flow became narrower and faster so as to be unfordable. A number of fords marked the creek up to the point where it divided into east and west branches.
"Washington expected Howe’s army to march from Kennett Square in the West up to Chad’s Ford and carry out a frontal assault. "
(http://www.britishbattles.com/brandywine.htm)
"The British grouped at nearby Kennett Square and formulated a plan. A portion of the British army was to
march from Kennett Square as if they intended to meet Washington on the banks of the river at Chadds Ford. Meanwhile, the majority of the army under Howe's direction would march north of Wistar's Ford, cross the river at a ford unknown to Washington, and march south into the flank of the American forces. Superior tactics and better knowledge of the area allowed the British to outwit Washington and his army."
The day of the battle,
"reports of British troop movements indicated to Washington that Howe had divided his forces . . . In the
confusion Washington persisted in the mistaken belief that the British were sending their entire force against his
line at Chadds Ford. Meanwhile, Howe and the majority of his force continued their approach. By mid-afternoon
the British had crossed the river at the unguarded ford to the north of Washington's force and they had gained a strategic position near Birmingham Friends Meeting House.
"When the British appeared on the American right flank, Washington realized that he had been
outmaneuvered. He ordered his army to take the high ground around Birmingham Friends Meeting House as a last defense. Unfortunately, in the confusion caused by the surprise, the Americans were unable to successfully
defend their position. . . ."
(http://www.ushistory.org/brandywine/thestory.htm)
"On 9th September 1777 Washington’s army took positions behind the Brandywine Creek at Chad’s Ford (now Chadds Ford). The creek flowed through undulating countryside with steep cliffs in places and heavily wooded hills. Below Chad’s Ford the flow became narrower and faster so as to be unfordable. A number of fords marked the creek up to the point where it divided into east and west branches.
"Washington expected Howe’s army to march from Kennett Square in the West up to Chad’s Ford and carry out a frontal assault. "
(http://www.britishbattles.com/brandywine.htm)
"The British grouped at nearby Kennett Square and formulated a plan. A portion of the British army was to
march from Kennett Square as if they intended to meet Washington on the banks of the river at Chadds Ford. Meanwhile, the majority of the army under Howe's direction would march north of Wistar's Ford, cross the river at a ford unknown to Washington, and march south into the flank of the American forces. Superior tactics and better knowledge of the area allowed the British to outwit Washington and his army."
The day of the battle,
"reports of British troop movements indicated to Washington that Howe had divided his forces . . . In the
confusion Washington persisted in the mistaken belief that the British were sending their entire force against his
line at Chadds Ford. Meanwhile, Howe and the majority of his force continued their approach. By mid-afternoon
the British had crossed the river at the unguarded ford to the north of Washington's force and they had gained a strategic position near Birmingham Friends Meeting House.
"When the British appeared on the American right flank, Washington realized that he had been
outmaneuvered. He ordered his army to take the high ground around Birmingham Friends Meeting House as a last defense. Unfortunately, in the confusion caused by the surprise, the Americans were unable to successfully
defend their position. . . ."
(http://www.ushistory.org/brandywine/thestory.htm)
"Nightfall finally brought an end to the battle. The defeated Americans retreated to Chester."
(http://www.ushistory.org/brandywine/thestory.htm)
(http://www.ushistory.org/brandywine/thestory.htm)
The Americans failed partly because "many American unites [sic] experienced difficulty in forming and maneuvering; many regiments only knew how to maneuver in single files. Such dangerous delays under fire alarmed Continental Army officers and led the army to seek professional training by Prussian-born Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben (1730-1794) at Valley Forge. . . ."
(http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/trails_of_history/4287/brandywine_battlefield_park_%28ph%29/472297)
(http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/trails_of_history/4287/brandywine_battlefield_park_%28ph%29/472297)
The Battle of Germantown
After the defeat at Brandywine, Washington "drew up a plan which provided that four prongs of the American army would push into Howe simultaneously at 5:00 A.M. on October 4. Major John Armstrong and his Pennsylvania militia would advance down the Manatawny Road on the American right and behind the British left. [John] Sullivan with his own and [Anthony] Wayne's reinforced brigade would deliver the main blow down the Skippack road, which cut the town in two; [Nathanael] Green [sic] would lead his force, including [Adam] Stephen's division and Alexander McDougall's brigade, along Limekiln Road to the northeast of Skippack; and a mile farther to the left [William] Smallwood with Maryland and New Jersey militia would march down the old York Road and if all went well cut into the British right and into the rear of their main encampments."
(http://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1775strategy/771004german.html)
"The American columns started along their respective approach roads on the evening of 3rd October 1777. Dawn found the American forces well short of their start line for the attack [due to slow marching] and there was an encounter with the first British picquet which fired its guns to warn of the attack. The outpost was supported by a battalion of light infantry and the 40th Foot under Colonel Musgrave. It took a substantial part of Sullivan’s division to drive back the British contingent."
(http://www.britishbattles.com/germantown.htm)
Despite this, "The . . . Americans . . . had the British retreating But Washington's plan went astray when one of his four columns lost its bearings in a dense fog and thick smoke" caused by the battle for the Chew House.
(http://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/germantown.htm)
(http://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1775strategy/771004german.html)
"The American columns started along their respective approach roads on the evening of 3rd October 1777. Dawn found the American forces well short of their start line for the attack [due to slow marching] and there was an encounter with the first British picquet which fired its guns to warn of the attack. The outpost was supported by a battalion of light infantry and the 40th Foot under Colonel Musgrave. It took a substantial part of Sullivan’s division to drive back the British contingent."
(http://www.britishbattles.com/germantown.htm)
Despite this, "The . . . Americans . . . had the British retreating But Washington's plan went astray when one of his four columns lost its bearings in a dense fog and thick smoke" caused by the battle for the Chew House.
(http://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/germantown.htm)
Major Armstrong's secondary attack had the British retreating, until they took up positions at the Chew House. Then an "ill judged delay was made and the troops impeded in their warm pursuit[.] There a flag was sent in, insulted and the bearer wounded, where also a number of our people fell by the wall pieces and musquetry from the house which proved too strong for the metal of our field pieces." The Americans' failed attempt to take the building fatally delayed the secondary attack.
(Armstrong, Letter to General Gates, http://www.historycentral.com/Revolt/battleaccounts/Germantown/GermantownGates.html)
(Armstrong, Letter to General Gates, http://www.historycentral.com/Revolt/battleaccounts/Germantown/GermantownGates.html)
"A determined stand by British troops in the Chew House wrecked Washington's plan of attack at Germantown on October 4, 1777. The house had been completed in 1763 by Benjamin Chew, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania."(http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/colonials-patriots/sitec38.htm)
Washington's troops marched to the Chew House. Continental troops commanded by General Stephen, who was drunk throughout the day and confused by heavy gun smoke, attacked General Wayne's forces. They fought each other briefly before fleeing from the battlefield. Lacking General Wayne's support, General Sullivan was forced to retreat. "Greene, learning that Sullivan's column was retreating and that he now stood alone against the whole British force, ordered his men to withdraw. . . ."
(http://militaryhistory.about.com/gi/o.htm?zi=1/XJ&zTi=1&sdn=militaryhistory&cdn=education&tm=424&f=11&su=p284.13.342.ip_&tt=11&bt=1&bts=1&zu=http%3A//www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/events/4279/battle_of_germantown/473342)
(http://militaryhistory.about.com/gi/o.htm?zi=1/XJ&zTi=1&sdn=militaryhistory&cdn=education&tm=424&f=11&su=p284.13.342.ip_&tt=11&bt=1&bts=1&zu=http%3A//www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/events/4279/battle_of_germantown/473342)
"The failures of the day undoubtedly arose in part from a plan which was much too complicated to fulfill. The plan called for coordinated attacks by four widely separated forces. Their failures of coordination are often cited as reason for the defeat. Washington blamed the fog for a lack of coordination, but the mounted messengers and the flankers cach column was supposed to send out might have kept the brigades in touch with one another even through the fog."
(http://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1775strategy/771004german.html)
(http://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1775strategy/771004german.html)
Defeated due to a combination of bad luck, overly complicated strategy, lack of consistency in the intelligence reports, and poor discipline and preparation, the Continentals retreated to Valley Forge. Although some of their problems were beyond anyone's control, Steuben's training would allow them to implement complicated strategies successfully.
Professor Daniel Crosswell, Colonel Richard R. Hallock Distinguished University Chair in Military History, Columbus State University,
talks about discipline and doctrine.
talks about discipline and doctrine.
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